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Abstract: The Bank of Amsterdam, founded in 1609, was the first public bank to offer accounts not directly 
convertible to coin. As such, it can be described as the first true central bank. The debut of central bank 
money did not result from any conscious policy decision, however, but instead arose almost by accident, in 
response to the chaotic monetary conditions during the early years of the Dutch Republic. This paper 
examines the history of this momentous development from the perspective of modern monetary theory.  
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The Dutch Republic in its early years experienced monetary problems common to 
all states using a metallic system. For example, economic growth necessitated the 
acquisition of ever more monetary bullion. The Republic also suffered from what 
Adam Smith termed the “small-state” problem of incremental debasement. The 
Republic was awash in foreign coins and these were widely used as media of ex-
change.
1 A debasement in any coin could lead to uncertainty in the value of pay-
ments, creating transaction costs that hampered commerce. 
The Dutch authorities attempted to deal with the debasement problem through 
laws and regulations, but these were often slow and ineffective. It took decades, 
for example, for the Republic to establish full control over its numerous inde-
pendent mints. By contrast, laws assigning coin values were enacted early and 
often, but these did not solve the problem of debasement. While intended to sim-
plify the use of coins by giving them a known value (tale) in terms of a unit of 
account, we argue that these laws, called mint ordinances, had the unintended 
consequence of making the situation worse. The disconnect between legal and 
intrinsic value encouraged people to bring old coins with high intrinsic, but low 
legal value to the mint in order to repay their debts with the new debased coins. 
The mints benefited as well from the consequent increase in business and their 
government owners benefited from the increase in seigniorage. Then as now, 
there was no free lunch, as the garnering of seigniorage through debasement im-
posed an onerous burden on the Dutch economy. 
Another regulatory approach was the creation of an exchange bank or Wisselbank. 
Exchange banks were intended to address the debasement problem by effectively 
limiting deposits to coins above a certain quality. When debt was settled within 
the exchange bank, lenders were protected from repayment in debased coin. To 
generate participation, municipalities, starting with Amsterdam in 1609, required 
that commercial debts embodied in bills of exchange had to be settled through the 
                                                 
1 Eight hundred foreign coins were officially recognized by the end of the sixteenth century (De-
hing and ‘t Hart 1997, 40).   2
city’s exchange bank. Because bills of exchange were the dominant vehicle for 
international trade credit, merchants were compelled to open an account with the 
exchange bank.
2 
This paper argues that the creation of this exchange bank, known as the Bank of 
Amsterdam or Amsterdamsche Wisselbank, was effective at reducing debasement. 
Settlement of bills in bank money blunted debasement incentives by, ultimately, 
decoupling the connection between common coins and their ordinance value in 
the Dutch unit of account called the florin.
3 In shielding creditors—the beneficiar-
ies (also called payees) of bills of exchange—from payment in debased coins, the 
exchange bank diminished mints’ ability to extract profits from these beneficiar-
ies. 
The initial success of the Wisselbank, however, was less than complete because 
much of the Republic’s payment system remained outside its control. The final 
stabilization of Dutch coinage required the emergence of effective control by the 
central government over the domestic mints. Also, the regulations controlling the 
exchange bank were initially adjusted in unhelpful ways, so the development of 
the payment system took unexpected turns. This paper tracks this institutional 
evolution of the Wisselbank within this nexus of regulations, coins, and bills of 
exchange in order to explain why the bank was founded, what effect it had, and 
how it evolved.
4  
One noteworthy, though unintended consequence of the Wisselbank’s success and 
peculiar regulatory changes was the creation of a new, parallel unit of account for 
major commercial transactions. A receipt for 10 florins held in banco (the term 
                                                 
2 Bills of exchange came to dominate short-run international finance in Northern Europe during 
the second half of the sixteenth century (de Vries and van der Woude 1997, 130). While bills of 
exchange dominated contracts for less than 3 months, bills obligatory (IOUs) were very important 
for 3 to 12 month borrowing (Gelderbloom 2003, 627) 
3 Synonymous with the guilder or gulden. The silver florin of Charles V was a coin set to be worth 
twenty stuiver coins, but the debasement of stuivers drove florins out of circulation in the six-
teenth century (see Dehing and `t Hart (1997, 38); van Dillen (1934, 82). By the founding of the 
Wisselbank in 1609, the unit of account in most of the Dutch Republic remained the florin despite 
there no longer being florin coins.  
4 Our view of the Amsterdam Wisselbank agrees with Gillard (2004), but our focus is on the Re-
public’s domestic monetary system rather than the Florin’s international standing.   3
for exchange bank money) came to represent more money than 10 florins current 
(the term for local money). Though unwieldy to modern eyes, this system of par-
allel units of account seemed to have worked extremely well in practice.
5 
Another unintended consequence of the Wisselbank took even longer to evolve, 
but was ultimately even more revolutionary in nature. By the late seventeenth 
century, exchange bank money lost the right of redemption into coins altogether, 
and the Wisselbank came to have no obligation to redeem its deposits on demand. 
Anticipating today’s fiat money regimes, the predominant unit of account, the 
bank florin, was then no longer bound to any particular coin. Instead, the value of 
balances held at the Wisselbank derived from their ability to discharge debts. This 
development represented a historic shift in the nature of money, one that leads us 
to characterize the Wisselbank as the first true “central bank.” In its mature form, 
the Bank of Amsterdam allowed the inhabitants of the Dutch Republic to,  
[R]eap the advantages of a fixed exchange rate for their interna-
tional trade and finance, encouraging their own merchants as well 
as foreign merchants to use their financing facilities for long-
distance trade and long-term finance. At the same time, they were 
able to maintain the shock absorber benefits of a flexible exchange 
rate for their domestic economic activity (Neal 2000, 122). 
In a previous paper (Quinn and Roberds 2005) we set out a formal model of the 
problematic monetary situation in the early years of the Republic, and of the im-
pact of the Bank of Amsterdam on this situation. Though stylized, the model al-
lows for an examination of some (perhaps underappreciated) general-equilibrium 
aspects of the Dutch “debasement problem.” The present paper reviews the narra-
tive history of the early years of the Bank of Amsterdam. We show that our styl-
ized model has strong explanatory power even as a number of the complexities 
that characterized the Dutch economic system are addressed.
6 
                                                 
5 A modern analog might be the custom, common in some countries, of pricing large transactions 
in U.S. dollars and smaller ones in the local currency. 
6 Many of the original documents relevant to the history of the Wisselbank are available in a col-
lection compiled by van Dillen (1925). Given our limited facility with seventeenth-century Dutch, 
we rely heavily on van Dillen’s (1964a,b) account, which is largely based on these documents. An   4
 
I. Debasement, the Underlying Problem. 
Around 1600, the fundamental monetary problem for the Dutch Republic was that 
debtors (or their agents called cashiers) had an incentive to pass debased coins to 
their creditors. Why did this opportunity to profit from light coins exist? Because 
bills of exchange were debts denominated in the unit of account (florins). The flo-
rin did not correspond to any particular coin; the value of various coins in terms 
of florins was specified through mint ordinances. When a debtor had two coins 
with the same ordinance value (tale), he and/or his cashier had incentives to pass 
the lighter one on to his creditor in a “Gresham’s Law”
7 type decision.
8 
A key constraint in this story is that the debtor be willing to give his heavy coins 
to be debased into lighter coins. The debtor eventually profits only if the amount 
of silver (seigniorage) he pays the mint for the new, lighter coin is less than the 
amount of silver he avoids paying his creditor. In other words, a debasement is 
successful only if the mint and the debtor can share the silver that they are deny-
ing the creditor, in which case both mint and debtor have an incentive to “col-
lude” against a creditor.
9 
Establishing the debtor’s incentive to participate in the debasement is important. 
Lacking this incentive, mints could offer debased coins, but no one would supply 
them the silver (Rolnick et al., 1996). For example, an attempt to debase coins 
                                                                                                                                     
English-language summary of this account can be found in van Dillen (1934). Coinage data are 
from Polak (1998a, b). 
7 We use the term “Gresham’s law” with considerable caution, as our approach is inconsistent with 
some common interpretations of this “law.” 
8 For expositional convenience, our discussion will proceed “as if” a debt would always be repaid 
in coin. As discussed in more detail below, debts were more commonly repaid by either (a) trans-
fer of balances held with an intermediary known as a cashier, or (b) assignment of a bill of ex-
change. Below we will argue that this institutional detail is inessential for our argument, since 
these forms of payment typically represented claims redeemable only in debased coin, or non-
debased coin at a substantial premium above its legal value. 
9 Again this story should not necessarily be taken as literal description. Debasement might also 
occur at the hands of cashiers or moneychangers, who were in fact widely condemned for this 
practice (see below). Debtors holding undervalued coins could also “synthetically” subject these to 
debasement by using them to import goods which could then be sold for lighter coin.   5
could cause the market price of heavy coins to rise, so people lose their incentive 
to bring heavy coins to the mint, and the debasement would fail. In fact, the mar-
ket price of coins commonly exceeded their legal value, and this helped keep 
heavy coins from vanishing entirely. 
When retiring a debt, however, a creditor can insist on payment in coin valued at 
its ordinance value rather than its market value. A debtor can respond by finding 
some of the new, lighter coin that could discharge the debt at a legally set value. 
The point is not that heavy coins will not be used to settle debts; rather, that the 
threat of passing light coins establishes the debtor’s best alternative to no agree-
ment. If the creditor insists on heavier coin, then the creditor has to pay the debtor 
extra for it. The increase in the market price of heavy coins does not help the 
creditor if the debtor has light but legal coins with which to settle the debt. 
The brake on the incentive to debase is the requirement that the debased coins re-
tain some legal value. Too great of a debasement could cause creditors to chal-
lenge a coin’s legal standing. For example, the Republic appears to have promul-
gated regulations stating that creditors had a right to insist that debt settlement use 
the coinage standards from when a debt was contracted.
10 The incentive to en-
force such a right would increase with the rate of debasement and the size of the 
debt, so small debasements had a clear advantage. Moreover, the costs of legal 
action were substantial, and early modern merchants appear to have rarely re-
sorted to formal legal procedures. Instead, problems that resisted the threat of le-
gal action were dealt with using “amicable settlement” or the acceptance of a loss, 
“rather than engaging in endless litigation (Gelderbloom 2003, 634).” 
                                                 
10 Oscar Gelderbloom has kindly informed us that such a regulation is mentioned in a legal advice 
to the High Court of Holland that published in the mid-seventeenth century "Waerdije van eenige 
Munte veranderd zijde, moet men insien de Waardij, dieze hadde ten tijde van het contract ende 
niet ten tijde van de betalinge" Consultatiën, Advysen en Advertissementen, gegeven ende 
gechreven bij bverscheyden Treffelijcke Rechts-Geleerden in Hollandt, zes delen (Rotterdam, J. 
Naeranus, 1645-1666;  volume IV, page 69).   6
Each debasement tended to be relatively small—a drop in the silver content of a 
few percent at most.
11 As lighter coins became standard, however, the incentive 
redeveloped to debase again, leading to a pattern of mild but persistent debase-
ment.  Moreover, incentives to debase could be equally great at neighboring mints 
whose coins infiltrated the Dutch monetary stock (Dehing and ‘t Hart 1997, 37-8). 
Figure 1 shows the general pattern of official coin valuations for the Dutch Re-
public and two of its neighbors over the second half of the sixteenth century.  
Over this period, the fine-metal content of silver coins within the Republic fell by 
about 1 percent per year, on average. Most of the decline coincides with the pres-
sures financing the Dutch Revolt (also called the Eighty Years War) that began in 
1568, paused in 1609, resumed in 1621 and finally ended in 1648 (Fritschy 2003). 
                                                 
11 On the other hand, a debasement also had to be large enough to generate incentives to bring 
metal into the mint.   7
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Source: Metz 1990. 
Authorities could attempt to adjust minting-ordinance values quickly, but a move 
to raise ordinance values to match the market prices of heavy coins just locks in 
the losses to creditors. Again, debtors may be willing to give heavy coins, but the 
higher price per coin means that creditors still see less silver than they expected. 
In practice, ordinance adjustments lagged actual price changes. 
Creditors could try to insulate themselves by adding a risk premium when agree-
ing to accept a bill of exchange denominated in florins. The result would weaken 
the Dutch exchange rate and reduce bill-financed trade.
12 This approach, however, 
does not discourage a debtor from participating in a debasement. Indeed, a debtor 
would need to participate in a debasement in order to cover the risk premium al-
ready contracted into the bill of exchange. 
                                                 
12 In the words of Adam Smith “if foreign bills of exchange are paid in this currency [such as the 
florin], the uncertain value of any sum, of what is in its own nature so uncertain, must render the 
exchange always very much against [a country such as the Republic], its currency being, in all 
foreign states, necessarily valued even below what it is worth (Wealth of Nations IV.3.12).”   8
An important question is whether these problems could have been circumvented 
through purely private means (Rolnick et al. 1996). In his discussion of the events 
preceding the founding of the Wisselbank, van Dillen (1964a, 340-345) casts 
doubt upon the efficacy of private remedies. Settling debts in a specific coin or 
amount of metal would have been prohibitively expensive. In practice, debts were 
routinely settled through assignment of bills, or transfer of accounts on the books 
of cashiers (primitive banks); there was simply not enough coin to accommodate 
the payment needs of a commercial center such as Amsterdam. Attempts were 
made to outlaw the settlement of debts through assignment (1602) and to prohibit 
cashiers outright (1604 and again in 1608) but these were quickly abandoned. The 
“netting” function provided by these types of payment was deemed essential, par-
ticularly at times of year such as June and November, when bills of exchange tra-
ditionally came due.
13 
The activities of the cashiers and their fellow intermediaries, the moneychangers, 
were in turn quite difficult for the authorities to monitor.
14 Moneychangers were 
bound by oath to uphold the minting ordinances, but the availability of “illegiti-
mate” moneychangers weakened adherence to these oaths. In discussions of this 
situation with the Dutch monetary authorities, the Amsterdam business commu-
nity voiced a preference for settlement on the books of a municipal bank of “supe-
rior authority” to the private cashiers. The Amsterdam city council (vroedschap) 
favored a plan under which the Republic would establish an exchange bank in 
each commercial city,
15 but this plan was ignored by the governing body of the 
Republic, the States General. In response, the city council took unilateral action, 
creating the Wisselbank in January 1609 (van Dillen 1964a, 333). 
 
                                                 
13 This discussion obviously begs the even deeper question, which we cannot address here, of why 
debts were denominated in florin and not units of precious metal. 
14 Cashiers and moneychangers were legally distinct types of intermediaries, but this distinction 
was not always observed in practice. 
15 This proposal for a geographically dispersed system of central bank-like institutions anticipated 
(by about three centuries) similar proposals in late nineteenth-century U.S.   9
II. Complications. 
A. Cashiers. 
In our basic story, mints and debtors use debasement to take advantage of the 
rigid ordinance values of coins. Actual settlement appears to have more often in-
volved the use of intermediaries known as cashiers or kassiers. We now provide a 
brief description of the cashiers’ activities and their relevance for the monetary 
situation. 
Like modern banks, cashiers held deposits and provided certain other financial 
services, most notably local payment by “giro” or book-entry.
16 As financial in-
termediaries, cashiers were in a stronger position than the typical merchant to 
have the numismatic sophistication to cull out heavy coins and knowingly accept 
and pass light coins. While the small percentages of silver involved with debase-
ment may have seemed a minor issue for a merchant, the same silver would have 
been a substantial part of a cashier’s income as that income was derived from 
processing other people’s money. 
Of course, cashiers could take a similar approach to withdrawals of deposits and 
other financial transactions. In this sense, cashiers played the role of the “debtor” 
benefiting from debasement, while anyone using a financial intermediary was a 
suffering creditor. At the time of the Wisselbank’s founding, cashiers were under 
frequent condemnation for these practices. An attempt by Amsterdam in 1604 to 
ban cashiers noted that cashiers 
allow for fraudulent activity, especially the removal of heavy gold 
and silver coins, and their transport to prohibited and other mints, 
in order to be converted into new (light) coins, which are then cir-
culated within the community. (our translation of van Dillen 
1964a, 344) 
                                                 
16 A crucial exception being international remittances, which were largely accomplished through 
bills of exchange.   10
B. Multiple Mints. 
Another institutional wrinkle that promoted debasement was the diffuse political 
structure of the Dutch Republic. 14 government mints and 40 private mints meant 
plenty of opportunities for mints to serve local revenue needs (Dehing and ‘t Hart 
1997, 39; Korthals Altes 2001, 41). Because all were legally recognized and cre-
ated a common pool of coin, debasement was a type of tragedy of the commons 
whereby the rewards went to the first to debase. 
Another significant source of debased coins was the Southern Netherlands. Here, 
the twist is that Dutch heavy coins did not have to be melted down to produce 
light coins because the export of goods could finance debasement instead. A great 
deal of light coin was minted in the southern Netherlands and shipped to the 
Dutch Republic to finance the south’s trade deficit with the Republic. Causation 
could clearly run both ways: the profitable export of light coins by the Southern 
Netherlands “pulled” extra export goods from the Republic, just as trade imbal-
ances helped to “push” silver into the Republic, silver that happened to be light 
coins (e.g., Polak 1998a, 205). 
A piece of evidence in favor of the “pull” interpretation is that the southern coins 
were not treated as bullion (a commodity) to be minted into Republic coin. In-
stead, the debased coins were adopted into circulation because merchants and 
cashiers wanted them in that form. Debased coins were in demand since these 
could be used to short change creditors. The incentive to use southern coins was 
substantially increased when the Mint Ordinance of 1622 gave them a favorable 
fixed value in the Republic.
17 The Spanish Netherlands minted massive quantities 
of light coin for export to the Dutch Republic because of a massive demand for 
the light coins in the Dutch Republic.
18 The inflow of light coins could have been 
financed by an outflow of Republic coins, but export goods were preferable. The 
                                                 
17 This occurred less than a decade after a failed 1613 attempt to ban the importation of “counter-
feit Burgundian silver dollars” (Korthals Altes 2001, 51). 
18 We take the adjective massive from de Vries and van der Woude (1997), p. 83, “The enormous 
trade deficit that the Southern Netherlands ran with the North throughout the first half of the sev-
enteenth century resulted in a massive flow of these coins into the Republic.”   11
southern Netherlands already had access to plentiful Spanish silver, while the Re-
public had higher valued uses for silver in the Baltic and Asia. 
C. Distance between Debasement and Creditors. 
Another feature of our story is that the instigating shock is not arbitrage. Instead, a 
well-timed debasement serves as a type of tax or taking, whereby legal recogni-
tion of light coins denies creditors expected silver. The debtors who accept the 
light coin need not be literally the parties who supply mints with silver. Indeed, 
the extraction of seigniorage from minting a light coin, and the taking of silver 
from creditors, could be spread out along a chain of transactions. 
For example, a Flemish merchant could have silver gained through trade with 
Spain.  The Flemish merchant has the silver minted into light coin that is the coin-
age standard of Flanders. The Flemish merchant then makes a local purchase us-
ing his local coin. The new holder of the light coin then passes it onto a Dutch 
merchant to pay for the importation Dutch manufactured goods. The Dutch mer-
chant accepts the light coin at some discount to cover transportation expenses, but 
the Dutch merchant also expects his cashier in Amsterdam to accept the coin at 
tale. The cashier in Amsterdam accepts the light coin at tale because it can be 
used to satisfy creditors demand with less silver than other coins. 
The chain could be much longer if light coin migrates north via numerous local 
transactions. The point is that the process only requires someone willing to supply 
a mint with silver at the start of the chain and someone having to pay creditors at 
the other. 
 
III.  Minting and Melting. 
Once the shock of debasement occurs, then arbitrage causes the monetary system 
to adjust, and it is this process of arbitrage that produces the dynamic process seen 
in the Netherlands. To analyze the interaction of multiple coins with legally fixed   12
exchange rates, this section uses a framework developed by Redish (1990), Sar-
gent and Smith (1997), Sargent and Velde (2002), and Sussman and Zeira (2003). 
The conclusion is that persistent debasement gives rise to inflation, a weakening 
exchange rate, calls for adjustment of mint ordinance prices, and, if adjustment is 
too slow or insufficient, demonetization of heavy coins.
19 
The dynamics of adjustment in a monetary system under a metallic standard 
hinges on the fact that coins always have two values, the value of the metal in 
them (intrinsic value) and the value of their coined form (tale) as set out by regu-
lations like mint ordinances. When the tale value is greater than the intrinsic value 
by enough to cover minting and seigniorage costs, people will bring precious 
metal to the mint to be converted into coins. In contrast, when the intrinsic value 
is greater than the tale value, people will melt coins into bullion or, equivalently, 
treat coins like bullion rather than as a circulating means of payment. 
Taking into account ordinance prices, metallic content, minting costs and seign-
iorage, each coin has a minting point (which Redish calls the mint price) and a 
melting point (called the mint equivalent). The mint price is the value to someone 
of bringing precious metal to a mint so the metal can be converted into coin. The 
mint equivalent is the value to someone of melting a coin back into bullion. The 
difference between the two prices is the cost of the minting process, so the mint 
equivalent is higher than the mint price because the cost of minting has already 
been paid for a finished coin. Figure 2 gives the minting and melting points for a 
particular coin, the rixdollar or Rijksdaalder, at the time of the Wisselbank’s 
founding in 1609. If the value of a mark
20 of pure silver was less than 22.621 flo-
rin, then one had an incentive to bring the silver to the mint. In contrast, it the 
                                                 
19 While bimetallic issues are also important, we focus on only silver, for silver appears to have 
been the focus of both debasement and specie flows. 
20 Eight troy ounces.   13
value of a mark of pure silver was greater than 22.977 florin, then one had the in-
centive to treat a rixdollar coin as bullion and so demonetize it.
21 
Figure 2. Mint Points for the Rixdollar in 1609 
Increasing price level,  
measured as Florin value  














Source: Polak 1998a, 70. 
When a system has two coins, then the mint-melt points of both coins can be 
placed on the same price continuum, but the mint and melt points are unlikely to 
match exactly. Smaller coins have relatively higher production costs, so their mint 
points tend to be lower than larger coins. Also, mint ordinances may not correctly 
relate prices to intrinsic values. For example, the lioncrown, or Leeuwendaalder, 
was a Dutch silver trade coin that was 95 percent of the weight of the rixdollar. 
Figure 2 gives the mint and melt points for both coins in 1609. At this time, the 
lioncrown’s melt point is to the left of the rixdollar’s mint point, so the incentive 
is to melt lioncrowns, and, if prices are low enough, mint rixdollars. 
                                                 
21 The difference between mint price and mint equivalent of the rixdollar is approximately 1.5%, 
which is typical for silver coins of this period. Thus, even a relatively small debasement of one 
coin could demonetize or cause appreciation in the market values of competing coins.   14































































1619 Ordinance  
 
 
Source: Polak 1998a, 70-1. 
To maintain circulation, the market price of lioncrowns rose above the mint ordi-
nance value, with the effect that the mint-melt points shifted to the right when 
market prices were used. In 1615, the rising price was recognized by a new ordi-
nance, and the new mint-melt points are plotted in Figure 3 (van Dillen 1964a, 
355). Now rixdollars were undervalued relative to lioncrowns, and the market 
price of rixdollars rose. In 1619, yet another ordinance raised the legal value of 
rixdollars, and now lioncrowns were discouraged.
22 The desire of authorities to 
have ordinance prices match market prices created a destabilizing process, and, 
however well intentioned, the ordinances provided creditors no assurance against 
future revaluations. Indeed, a sufficiently aggressive increase in a coin’s legal 
value could itself amount to a backhanded sort of debasement. 
Debasement also shifted mint-melt points for the same type of coin produced by 
different mints. The lighter coin will lie to the right of the heavier coin, so the 
                                                 
22 The province of Holland unilaterally raised the legal valuation to 2.6 Florin (van Dillen 1964a, 
355).   15
mint producing the lighter coin gets work and earns seigniorage. For example, 
Figure 4 shows the production of the rixdollar in 1607 for five provincial mints.
23 
These mints are for the large provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, West-
Friesland and Gelderland. Mint output, measured as legitimate seigniorage in-
come, was highly correlated with the amount of debasement per mint. Debase-
ment income is an estimate by Republic officials of the income derived by each 
mint for coins falling below official tolerances of weight and fineness (Polak 
1998a, 112-3). These numbers are available because Republic officials audited 
mint output using weighing and trial by fire.
24 In 1607, Holland had the most ac-
curate rixdollar production (no assessments for light coins), but Holland also had 
the least demand for its minting services. In contrast, West Friesland had the most 
minting activity (seigniorage) and the most debasement. 























Source: Polak 1998b, 103-68. 
 
                                                 
23 1607 is used because it is just before the founding of the Wisselbank, and it is the year in this 
period for which the most mints are reported (Polak 1998b, 103-49) 
24 Details of how these data were collected are discussed in Polak (1998, 107-139).   16
IV. Systemic Adjustment. 
To connect mint behavior with the general economy, Sargent and Velde (2002) 
convert the unit of measurement from the price of bullion to the price of a com-
posite consumption good, i.e., the domestic price level. Consider the situation 
when an economy has only one type of coin. If domestic prices are too low (be-
low the mint point), then people can increase their domestic purchasing power by 
exporting consumer goods to where their prices are higher, then importing the re-
sulting silver, and finally have the silver minted into coin. High prices (above the 
melt point) reverse the incentives. 
The advantage of viewing the process from the perspective of the price of goods 
instead of the price of silver is that a process of systemic adjustment emerges.
25 
When people follow these incentives, the money supply and price level change 
until the incentive is eliminated, so minting and melting points create a self-
adjusting process that is a type of specie-flow mechanism (Sargent and Velde 
2002, 15-36). Minting coins increases the domestic money supply and can cause 
inflation. Enough inflation raises the price level above the melting point, and the 
process reaches an equilibrium. Melting works in reverse. 
At first glance, debasement does not appear to trigger an international flow of 
metal because the existing metal stock is simply being re-minted into a new form 
with a higher nominal value, more coins, each worth the same number of florins 
as before. Consider this in terms of the equation of exchange MV=Py where M is 
the nominal monetary stock, P is the price level, y is real GDP and V is the veloc-
ity of money. In a frictionless world, the increase in P would be matched by an 
equal increase in nominal M. In other words, the real monetary stock remains un-
changed, so no change in real income or velocity was necessary. 
                                                 
25 In practice, one can measure changes in domestic price level using price indices such as a con-
sumer or commodity price index. For example, see Sargent and Velde (2002, 35, 159, 193-4). Al-
ternatively, one can measure the international exchange rate to gauge the value of the local unit of 
account. For example, see Quinn (1996).   17
This does not hold, however, if mints siphon metal out of the money stock of the 
economy. Such a drain would have easily resulted from military expenditures by 
provinces and cities during the wars against Spain.
26 Another drain would have 
resulted from Dutch metal crossing the border to foreign mints specializing in ri-
val coins or even counterfeits. In these situations, it can be shown algebraically 
that the increase in M stemming from a debasement is less than the minimum fea-
sible increase in P.
27 Unless velocity (V) can be increased, real GDP (y) falls for 
the transitionary period and the export of goods is required to “rebuild” the real 
money stock (M/P) and return the economy to its previous level of activity.
28 We 
are not in a position to estimate the scale of this welfare loss, but the persistence 
of debasement and inflation in the Netherlands in this era suggests a substantial 
effect.
29 
It can also be shown that this systemic adjustment can be mitigated, if the market 
price of the heavy coin rises in response to a debasement, shifting its mint-melt 
points to the right. The coin develops a market price greater than its mint-
ordinance price. While this keeps the heavy coin from being melted, it does not 
help creditors who face repayment in either lighter-than-expected coins or fewer-
than-expected heavy coins. When a new mint ordinance eventually recognizes the 
higher price of old, heavy coins, it still does not compensate a creditor caught in 
the debasement. Only instantaneous adjustment of the minting ordinance that 
                                                 
26 An important component of military expenditure was the feeding of armies in the field, which in 
turn involved the importation of grain. 
27 Detailed calculations are given in Quinn and Roberds (2005). 
28 I.e., debasement served as a form of taxation, levied by coin holders on themselves. Given that 
coinage freely flowed across borders, debasement offered cash-strapped governments the possibil-
ity of taxing not only their own economy but simultaneously the economies of their neighbors. 
29 Of course, there is always the temptation of informed conjecture. Before the founding of the 
Wisselbank, the metallic content of the Republic’s coinage was dropping at a rate of about one 
percent per florin per year. The resultant welfare loss depends on the velocity of circulation, about 
which little is known. Available estimates suggest that in the eighteenth-century Republic velocity 
was extremely low, on the order of 1.5, based on money and income estimates reported in de Vries 
and van der Woude (1997, 86, 702). Taking a figure of 1.5 as a lower bound for velocity and 10 
for an upper bound (the number for the late nineteenth-century U.S.), a velocity of 2-3 seems a 
reasonable “guesstimate” for the early Republic. This would then imply a annual loss of one-third 
to one-half percent of national income due to debasement, a considerable hindrance to the dy-
namic performance of the economy.   18
lowered the price of debased coins would have offered protection; obviously this 
was not practical. 
 
V. The Wisselbank. 
If debasement, as described in the previous sections, was the monetary problem 
plaguing the Dutch Republic, then a solution was to end the incentives to debase. 
The most direct mechanism was to correctly value debased coins when those 
coins were used to discharge a debt. The Amsterdam city council partially 
achieved this goal when it created an exchange bank in 1609. Exchange banks 
(government-owned deposit banks) had developed in the Mediterranean as a sub-
stitute for private, fractional reserve banks (Usher 1943). In response to banking 
instability, cities like Venice created municipal exchange banks that did not lend 
reserves, so the system of payments based on bills of exchange had a stable mone-
tary base (Mueller 1997). A public bank arose in Genoa as an adjunct to an insti-
tution that managed the public debt (Fratianni and Spinelli 2005). The Bank of 
Amsterdam was modeled on the Venetian institution, but the primary focus was 
on stabilizing the coinage rather than the banking system.
30 
For Amsterdam, the key aspect of the exchange bank was that any deposit of ille-
gal coins would be valued by the bank based solely on their metal content (intrin-
sic value). Withdrawals, in contrast, would be paid in certain types of coin, called 
trade coin or negotiepenningen), of a consistent weight and value. In this way, 
debts payable through the exchange bank would be protected from debasement 
because any deposit of debased coin would have its value at the Wisselbank pro-
portionally reduced. The incentive to debase would be removed, so the thinking 
                                                 
30 De Vries and van der Woude characterize the motivation as, “The great concern of the city fa-
thers was to protect and enlarge the supply of good, full-valued coin. This they regarded as far 
more important to the prosperity of a commercial economy than the proliferation of circulating 
bills (1997, 131).” We differ in asserting that the Wisselbank was designed to promote bills of 
exchange through the supply of heavy coin. We would add that the city prohibited bill assignment 
because bill circulation was seen as a means by which cashiers could hold back heavy coin (van 
Dillen 1964a, 345). Moving bill settlement to the Wisselbank solved this problem.   19
went, because debtors would no longer have the option of (however indirectly) 
settling debts in “overvalued” debased coin. 
To put this in practice, the Wisselbank had to become the intermediary that paid 
creditors on behalf of debtors. Cashiers had been doing just this, but, unlike cash-
iers, the Wisselbank would not pass on light coin. To provide incentives to use the 
Wisselbank, the Amsterdam city council included two regulations on private fi-
nance, (1) bills of exchange over 600 guilders had to be settled through the Wis-
selbank and (2) cashiers were outlawed.
31 The limit was reduced to 300 guilders 
in 1643 (Korthals Altes 2001, 49). The enforcement of these restrictions was evi-
dently less than perfect. Already in 1615, the city council felt the need to pass a 
resolution explicitly forbidding the settlement of bills outside of the Wisselbank 
(van Dillen 1964a, 349).  
Despite these difficulties, settlement of bills through the Wisselbank became the 
norm. Merchants could open an account at the Wisselbank or purchase “bank 
funds” through an intermediary. The Wisselbank did not charge a fee for bill set-
tlement, and the process was quick because settlement occurred as the transfer of 
funds from debtor to creditor account. The city guaranteed deposits and deposits 
these were secured against attachment by creditors (van Dillen 1964a, 349-353). 
The reduction in settlements costs for merchants was substantial, for “In the years 
leading up to the establishment of the Wisselbank in Amsterdam about 20 percent 
of the more than four hundred accounts in [an examined merchant’s] ledgers re-
lated solely to the settlement of bills of exchange (Gelderbloom 2003, 635).  
The Wisselbank did not offer overdraft facilities, and having insufficient funds 
could lead to penalties being assessed (van Dillen 1964a, 350). In this way, the 
Wisselbank monitored debtors and disseminated news of default (Neal 1990, 7). 
The coordination of information needed to promote a reputation mechanism was 
particularly valuable for a city that was the intersection of different trading routes, 
                                                 
31 The prohibition on cashiers was reversed in 1621; however, strict regulations forbade cashiers 
from holding customer money for more than 3 days (van Dillen 1964a, 353). Still, cashiers played 
an active role as intermediaries who arranged for payments in Wisselbank funds or receipt of the 
same.   20
for reducing the need for sector specific information assisted the blending of bills 
into a unified secondary market. Such market depth increased the liquidity of bills 
payable through the Wisselbank. 
 
VI. Regulatory Dilemma. 
The initial structure of the Amsterdam Exchange Bank provided some protection 
to creditors who held bills payable through the Wisselbank; however, its reach 
was limited. Other cities (Middelburg 1614, and Delft 1621 subsequently moved 
to Rotterdam in 1635) eventually opened exchange banks also, but the rest of the 
Dutch economy remained outside the system, and debasement of Republic coins 
continued. Simultaneously, the flow of light coins from the southern Netherlands 
increased during the Twelve Years’ Truce with Spain (1609-1621). As a result, 
the silver patagon and ducatoon, both coins from the southern Netherlands, be-
came common in Amsterdam by 1612 (van Dillen 1964a, 355).
32  
Continued debasement meant that the market price of heavy coins had to rise in 
order to keep them in circulation. This can be clearly seen in Figure 5, which 
compares the relative mint-melt points for a debased coin to the mint-melt points 
for full-weight rixdollars and lioncrowns in the 1610’s. We lack measures of ac-
tual metal content of debased coins, so the picture is an abstract. Also, the metric 
is the domestic price level, so the process of systemic adjustment is highlighted. 
With debased coins creating incentives to melt full-weight coins, the market price 
of rixdollars and lioncrowns increased, and that slid their de facto mint-melt 
points to the right. Again, the mint ordinances of 1615 and 1619 were simply offi-
cial validation of the market prices of these coins. 
                                                 
32 These coins were expressly designed to compete with the Republic’s coins, in retaliation against 
the ongoing debasement of coins within the Republic (Korthals Altes 2001, 50-51). The patagon 
was also known as the “cross rixdollar.”   21
























































1619 Ordinance  






Source: See text. 
The ordinances of 1615 and 1619 satisfied one regulatory goal, keeping ordinance 
prices in line with circulating prices; however, the ordinances also undercut the 
Wisselbank’s mission to protect creditors. The Wisselbank was obliged by statute 
to follow ordinance prices, so the official increase in lioncrown and rixdollar val-
ues reduced the value of a deposit at the bank because the same number of florins 
now purchased fewer coins upon withdrawal. The effects of debasement were vis-
ited on creditors despite all the efforts to insulate them, because regulators forced 
Wisselbank valuations to match those from the debased side of the economy. The 
situation was a consequence having one policy tool, mint ordinances, trying to 
achieve two policy goals, insulating creditors from debasement while adjusting 
official prices to the reality of debasement. 
   22
VII.  Regulatory Odyssey. 
During its first fifty years, the Wisselbank was repeatedly caught between these 
two regulatory goals. The mint ordinances regulating the structure of the Dutch 
monetary system were repeatedly tweaked to either reflect debasement that had 
occurred or to undo the effects of debasement. Each change produced unintended 
consequences for both the Wisselbank and the monetary system. Eventually but 
erratically, regulators began to accept the solution to the dilemma, i.e., that the 
value of coins at the Wisselbank should differ from the value of the same coins in 
general circulation. 
This section of our paper navigates this chaotic era to show how the mint ordi-
nances were shocks to the monetary system, how the Wisselbank was thrown 
about, and how the Wisselbank ended the era in a new regulatory environment 
that would permit the Amsterdam exchange bank to evolve into a conceptually 
different institution, a central bank. Moreover, the pattern of evidence over these 
decades of regulatory change supports our focus on the Wisselbank as a solution 
to the problem of debasement. 
A.  The Mint Ordinance of 1619. 
The mint ordinance of 1619, which raised the official price of rixdollars, touched 
off a surge of minting. To show why this happened, we need to separate the coins 
depicted in Figure 5 above into domestic coins and the light coins moving up 
from the Spanish Netherlands. We focus on the Republic’s primary trade coin, the 
rixdollar, and its mimicker from south, the patagon. By debasing rixdollars, 
Dutch mints could achieve mint points above the melt points on patagons. This 
situation produces seigniorage for the debasing mints. 
   23
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Rixdollar, 1619 Ordinance 
 
Source: See text. 
There is some indirect evidence that this is what actually happened. Figure 7 
shows the amount of silver the minted as lioncrowns and rixdollars.
33 For later 
reference, the dates of major mint ordinances are superimposed. The measure of 
mint output is incomplete in that it only covers five provincial mints and has peri-
ods of missing observations.
34 The mints are Dordrecht in Holland; Hoorn, 
Enkhuizen and Medemblik in West-Friesland; Middelburg in Zeeland; Utrecht; 
and Harderwijk in Gelderland. The series are also lumpy, in that a mint’s produc-
tion total could encompass many years, so although all production levels have 
been converted into a per-day basis, the same value can run over many years. 
Lioncrown production spikes in 1617 as the 1615 ordinance value encouraged 
lioncrown production relative to rixdollars (see Section III, Minting and Melting 
                                                 
33 The data are derived from Polak (1998b, 103-145). Mint periods of less than 60 days (of which 
there were 6) are excluded because they have insufficient denominators for reliable relative meas-
ures. If two observations included the same year, then the one with more days in that year was 
used. 
34 This is also a somewhat biased sample, as unfortunately there are no data during this period for 
the municipal mints, which were on the whole less inclined to hold to the minting ordinances.   24
above). The process was focused in Utrecht, the mint on the southern frontier with 
the Spanish Netherlands. The rise and fall of lioncrown minting in 1616-18 was 
evidently driven by a surge in Utrecht production of lioncrowns in 1616 and then 
Utrecht switching its high levels of production from lioncrowns to rixdollars as 
the next ordinance favored the minting of rixdollars. 



















































































































Was the surge in minting driven by debasement? Figures 8 and 9 plot the amount 
of seigniorage that would have been earned by the five mints if they had produced 
full weight lioncrowns (Figure 8) and rixdollars (Figure 9). The figures also chart 
the penalties the mints were assessed for producing debased coin. These penalties 
were assessed by Republic mint officials in an effort to maintain the quality of the 
coinage. Interestingly, the penalties themselves were due from a mint’s master to 
the owner of the mint, i.e., the province. In other words, monitoring and assess-
ment of penalties by the national government created an incentive for provinces to 
condone debasement. We cannot speak to what other economic relationships ex-  25
isted between mint masters and their provinces, but the potential for mutual gain 
through debasement is obvious. 
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   26
For both coins, the relationship between demand for a coin (legitimate seign-
iorage) and penalties for debasement is striking. Again, the seigniorage values are 
for (hypothetical) full-weight coins, so the amount of additional seigniorage from 
coins being below tolerance is not known. Of course, the five mints varied in both 
the amount of minting they engaged in and the amount of debasement they were 
penalized for. Figure 10 plots the seigniorage and penalties for debasement by 
mint for the year 1620, the peak of rixdollar production. Again, demand for a 
mint’s business is positively related to its readiness to debase. 























Source: Polak 1998b, 103-68. 
What did the surge in debasement mean for the Amsterdam Wisselbank? It ap-
pears to have promoted deposits despite the revaluation of coins in 1615 and 
1619. Figure 11 shows that deposits at the Wisselbank grew rapidly in 1617 and 
1618 when debasement of the Wisselbank’s primary silver coins, rixdollars and 
lioncrowns, peaked. Available evidence also suggests that the number of accounts 
held at the Wisselbank also grew over this time period; Van Dillen (1964b, 406) 
puts the number of accounts at 708 in 1611 and 1202 in 1620. As debasement 
continued in the following years, so did the growth in Wisselbank deposits.   27
Unlike the other mints, Holland abstained from debasement, so coin minted for 
the Wisselbank maintained content.  









































































































Deposits at the Amsterdam Wisselbank (Left Scale)
Debasement Penalties on Rixdollars and Lioncrowns (Right Axis)
 
Source: Wisselbank deposits from van Dillen 1934, 117; penalties derived from 
Polak 1998b, 103-149. 
Finally, we should stress that Figure 11 does not include debasement from other 
sources, for example, small silver coins from municipal mints, patagons from the 
southern Netherlands, etc., so ours is very incomplete measure of overall debase-
ment. For example, the start of the Thirty Years’ War in Central Europe in 1618 
lead to five years of severe debasement and inflation throughout the German 
states (Sargent and Velde 2002: 257-60). Rixdollars and lioncrowns, however, 
were the basic coins of the Wisselbank, so their debasement elsewhere was a di-
rect threat to the creditors that used the Wisselbank.    28
B. The Mint Ordinance of 1622. 
In 1622, the Dutch Republic changed its regulatory approach. Instead of increas-
ing the official price of rixdollar and lioncrown coins, it instead created a legal 
value for the patagons “invading” from the southern Netherlands. The mint ordi-
nance created a fixed legal exchange rate between the insurgent patagons and the 
Republic’s system of coins. The 1622 ordinance set a legal value for the patagon 
at 2.35 florins, and it rolled the rixdollar back to 2.5 florins, so the rixdollar-to-
patagon ratio became 1.064 (van Dillen 1964a, 356).
35  The market values of the 
coins, however, were close to 2.6 florins for rixdollars and 2.5 florins for pata-
gons, so the market’s ratio was 1.04 (van Dillen 1964a, 355-6). This corresponds 
with the finding that southern coins had, “silver contents 4 percent lower than 
those of comparable Dutch coins (de Vries and van der Woude 1997, 83). In 
short, official prices overvalued rixdollars relative to patagons, and Figure 12 
draws the situation. 





















































Rixdollar, 1619 Ordinance 
 
Source: See text. 
                                                 
35 Holland had increased rixdollars to 2.6 florins the previous year.   29
One result was that people lacked an incentive to bring patagons to the Wissel-
bank or to the mints, so the minting of Dutch rixdollars declined precipitously.
36 
Our characterization of the 1622 ordinance is that it shifted the Patagon right-
wards, so that the incentive to mint rixdollars ended as domestic prices rose. Re-
turning to Figure 9, the amount of rixdollars produced by the five mints returned 
to pre-1616 levels under the new ordinance. 
At the same time, the ordinance increased incentives to import patagons into the 
Dutch Republic. The first half of the seventeenth century witnessed a surge in 
mint production in the southern Netherlands, and, from 1613 through 1656, the 
value of average annual mint output for the southern Netherlands was 4.2 million 
florin (de Vries and van der Woude 1997, 86). In contrast, the combined rixdollar 
and lioncrown production for these five mints only produces a rough estimate of 
1.6 million florins.
37 While much of the southern coinage was then exported by 
the Dutch Republic to the Baltic, Levant and Asia, what remained, “became the 
dominant circulating currency” in the Republic (de Vries and van der Woude 
1997, 83). 
At an aggregate level, the inflow of light coin promoted inflation. Figure 13 plots 
both the level of combined rixdollar-lioncrown minting and a consumer price in-
dex (CPI). The price level situation is not a simple money supply story, for the 
Dutch Republic and Spain resumed war in 1621; however, the Mint Ordinance of 
1622 also marked the beginning of a period of renewed fiscal, and hence, infla-
tionary pressures.
38  
                                                 
36 With the renewal of war with Spain in 1621, the loss of seigniorage from the decline in minting 
was particularly counterproductive for the Republic. 1621 begins an era of rapidly increasing long-
term borrowing (Fritschy 2003: 66). 
37 Using a per-day output of 191 marks at 23.5 florin per mark. 
38 In 1621, military expenditures “immediately doubled, exceeding 20 million per year in the mid-
1630s (de Vries and van der Woude 1997, 100)."   30














































































































Silver Coin Production CPI
1622
 
Source: Mint numbers from Polak (1998b); prices from van Zanden (2004) 
Was the Wisselbank able to protect creditors in this era? We answer “yes but only 
partially,” for the Wisselbank was able to limit declines in the external value of its 
deposits during an era of substantial domestic inflation. Table 1 contrasts changes 
in the exchange value of the florin, relative to the English pound, with changes in 
the Dutch domestic price level. Because the exchange rates are in averages for 
five-year periods, the other values have also been calculated as changes between 
five-year averages. The inflation from the early 1620s to the early 1630s corre-
sponds with a much smaller decreases in the florin. At the same time Wisselbank 
deposits continued to grow rapidly. We take this as evidence that the Wisselbank 
succeeded in protecting bills of exchange in Amsterdam, yet the exchange bank 
could not fully control the aggregate price level.   31
Table 1. Changes in External and Internal Value of the Florin 
  Change in Florin’s 
Exchange Rate  Change in CPI 
Change in Wissel-
bank Deposits 
1606-10 to 1611-15  -1%  2%   
1611-15 to 1616-20  +1%  0%  40% 
1616-20 to 1621-25  -2%  16%  52% 
1621-25 to 1626-30  -1%  14%  51% 
1626-30 to 1631-35  -2%  0%  10% 
1631-35 to 1636-40  +1%  -2%  50% 
1636-40 to 1641-45  -6%  1%  31% 
1641-45 to 1646-50  11%  10%  13% 
1646-50 to 1651-55  -4%  5%  -8% 
 
Source: Exchange rates from McCusker (1978, 55); price changes derived from 
van Zanden (2004); and Wisselbank changes from van Dillen (1934, 117-8). 
C. The Toleration of 1638 and the Crisis of 1641. 
By the late 1630s, patagons were circulating above their ordinance value. The 
production of rixdollars had dwindled to only Holland and Zeeland, for both prov-
inces had exchange banks. Lioncrowns were being minted primarily in West-
Friesland and Gelderland, but those two mints were also being assessed for de-
basement. In 1638, a new effort was made to reconcile ordinance prices with cir-
culating reality, so the value of patagons was raised by temporary “toleration” by 
over 6 percent from 2.35 to 2.5 florin each—the same as the official value for 
rixdollars. Not only did the official premium on rixdollars disappear, but patagons 
were lighter than rixdollars, so rixdollars swung to become undervalued (van Dil-  32
len 1964a, 360). In terms of mint-melt points (Figure 14), the toleration of 1638 
pushed patagons far to the right. 



















































Source: See text. 
This created a strong incentive to withdraw heavy rixdollars from the Wisselbank. 
People complained that rixdollars were flowing out of the bank, not to finance 
trade, but to send to the mints in the southern Netherlands (van Dillen 1964a, 
360). Production of rixdollars ceased (see Figure 9 above), and merchants com-
plained that it was impossible to get good, heavy silver coins. In the process, 
“rixdollars and lioncrowns completely disappeared from circulation to be exclu-
sively used as commercial coins for export (van Dillen 1934, 88).”
39 
The Wisselbank apparently ran out of rixdollars sometime in 1640-41, so the 
Wisselbank violated its governing ordinances and began to give out patagons and 
ducatoons, another “light” southern Netherlands coin, for withdrawals.
40 This 
change was subsequently recognized by municipal ordinance in October 1641 
(van Dillen 1964a, 361). The change removed the incentive behind the with-
                                                 
39 Of course, coins exported to finance trade might easily reenter the Republic as patagons. 
40 In contrast, Rotterdam dealt with the shortage of heavy coin in 1639 by allowing English Mer-
chant Adventurers (the primary debtors having bills payable there) to circumvent the Rotterdam 
exchange bank (van Dillen 1964a, 362).   33
drawal process, but it also marked a failure of the Wisselbank to defend creditors 
and the value of bills of exchange. Once Amsterdam had declared the southern 
coins to be bank money, the exchange banks in Middelburg and Rotterdam 
quickly followed (van Dillen 1964a, 361). In turn, the florin exchange rate 
dropped 6 percent from its average value in the late 1630s to the early 1640s (see 
Table 1). Deposits at the Wisselbank first surged by 44 percent from January 1638 
to January 1640, then held steady for the year 1640, but then collapsed to below 
their 1638 levels.
41 
D. The Agio and the Mint Ordinances of 1645. 
After the crisis of 1641, the Dutch Republic struggled with how to deal with the 
patagons, for they were now the standard circulating coin and the de facto stan-
dard for the Wisselbank. The process was chaotic, for regulators could not recon-
cile themselves to the same coin, the patagon, having a different value in the Wis-
selbank relative to outside the Wisselbank. 
The regulatory mayhem began in March 1645, when the Republic passed a new 
mint ordinance that was a return the old 1622 system. The change was wrenching, 
for it meant that patagons were no longer legal money for withdrawal despite 
patagons having become the basis of the monetary system. Not surprisingly, Am-
sterdam merchants complained to the city, for the regulation threatened the liquid-
ity of the Wisselbank. 
Two months later, in May 1645, the city relented and empowered the Wisselbank 
to defy the mint ordinance and again issue patagons for withdrawals, but the 
withdrawal rate was set at 2.4 florin (van Dillen 1964a, 362). While this change 
did allow withdrawals, it would also created a 2 percent “haircut” for depositors, 
for patagons were valued at 2.35 florin when deposited. Perhaps the price differ-
ential was a concession the Wisselbank had to make to gain regulatory relief, but 
                                                 
41 The five-year averages used in Table 1 miss this drop in 1641 because of a one-year surge in 
deposits in 1644.   34
it would have been another failure to protect depositors had not the Wisselbank 
sought a remedy. 
The very next month, June 1645, the Wisselbank requested, and Amsterdam 
agreed, to raise the lawful value of patagons for deposit purposes, so deposit 
value equaled withdrawal value (van Dillen 1964a, 362). While the June rate ad-
justment protected new depositors, it did not help existing depositors. In August 
1645, when the Wisselbank was again running out of heavy coins and expected to 
cover withdrawals in patagons, the exchange bank gained permission from the 
city to adjust the rate to reflect the lightness of the coin (van Dillen 1964a, 362). 
The adjustment was called the agio, and it meant that more patagons were given 
out than their ordinance value would dictate, so the intrinsic value of deposits was 
maintained. 
Because the Wisselbank charged a small withdrawal fee, a market developed for 
buying and selling deposits on the Wisselbank. People had been contracting to 
avoid these fees from the opening of the Wisselbank, but now, for the first time 
since the decline of the rixdollar in 1622, the same coin was commonly on both 
sides of the exchange, so by the late 1640’s the market deepened as a standard 
type of trade emerged. Buyers and sellers of Wisselbank funds against “current 
money” (that which circulated outside the bank) would meet every morning at the 
square in front of the Amsterdam Town Hall. Often these were cashiers, who had 
by now established themselves as intermediaries in Wisselbank funds (van Dillen 
1964a, 366-7). The emergence of Wisselbank funds as a tradable commodity was 
a critical step in the evolution of the Wisselbank away from the medieval model 
of an exchange bank and towards something more closely resembling a central 
bank.
42 
The term “bank money” was already in use at this time, but initially this meant 
nothing more than “coin such as is kept at the Wisselbank.” The only difference 
between a patagon in the bank (banco) and a patagon outside the bank (current) 
                                                 
42 We believe this market to be the world’s first “open market” in central bank funds.   35
was the fee and the difference in official prices. The exchange rate that developed 
was also called the agio, but it was a market swap rate (current coins for deposit 
balances) rather than the actual rate used by the Wisselbank to calculate the 
amount of coins delivered upon withdrawal of a deposit. Indeed, arbitrage meant 
that the actual withdrawal rate created an upper limit on the market agio. The agio 
was measured as the ratio of current florin over bank florin. For example, if pata-
gons circulated at 2.5 florin, then the agio would be [1-(2.5/2.4)]*100 = 4.166, 
less a small amount for a share of the withdrawal fee. 
Table 2. The Agio (premium) on Wisselbank Deposits. 
Year 
(* Mint Ordinance)  Agio 
1645*  4 1/6 - 4.75% 
1646  0.75 - 2% 
1647  1.125 - 1.25% 










1658 No  observation 
   36
Source: 1645-48 observations from van Dillen (1964a, 363); 1649-57 observa-
tions from McCusker (1978, 46). 
The agio allows a direct measure of the current price of patagons, relative to the 
Wisselbank price, and Table 2 presents agio values from 1645 through 1657. Al-
though unstable, the development of the agio was a crucial step in the protection 
of creditors, for the agio allowed systemic adjustment while keeping the metal 
value of Wisselbank deposits constant. Debasement of circulating coins could be 
met with a virtually simultaneous increase in the agio, so debtors gained no ad-
vantage. Similarly, authorities could adjust the legal price of circulating coins, via 
tolerations, without upsetting the Wisselbank. Part of the process was that Wis-
selbank customers were becoming comfortable with the distinction between bank 
prices and current prices, comfortable with an exchange rate between the two 
units of account, and comfortable with brokers and dealers managing the market 
between the two kinds of money. 
E. Period of Transition, 1646-1658. 
The agio of 1645 brought a new dynamic to the Dutch monetary system. For ex-
ample, 1646 brought two new trends that lasted until 1651-2: (1) the production of 
rixdollars suddenly recovered, and (2) the CPI began to increase. Back in 1619-
21, rixdollar production had surged while prices were steady. After 1622, prices 
surged while rixdollar production collapsed. Now, both were increasing, and the 
difference was that rixdollars were no longer part of the circulating monetary 
stock. Rixdollars were now only produced and used for export. The production 
reflects a boom in international trade between the end of Eighty Years War in 
1648 and the First Anglo-Dutch war in 1652. Put another way, the mint-melt 
points for rixdollars used to describe earlier eras were no longer relevant. 
What was relevant was the quality and quantity of coins circulating in, but not 
minted in, the Dutch Republic. We have no direct measure of either, but we do 
have the agio. The initial agio of 1645 disappears by 1646 (see Table 2). That 
dramatic change suggests that the Wisselbank stopped offering to supplement   37
withdrawals and that patagons were circulating at around 2.45 florin. The rise in 
the agio from 1646 through 1652 suggests that patagons were rising in current 
price towards 2.5 florin, so it took ever slightly more of them to purchase a de-
posit at the Wisselbank. The increase in domestic prices over the same period, 
however, was far more dramatic. If the agio tells us that if the florin value of 
patagons was not surging, then quantity of them in circulation was. Debasement 
may have contributed to the influx of patagons, but it would not have been the 
primary story. Instead, during this period “real-side” effects likely took prece-
dence over monetary adjustments. The Dutch economy expanded strongly follow-
ing the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which ended war with Spain. Prices rose with 
the recovery and patagons streamed in to finance the resumption of trade with the 
South, and the growth of the economy more generally. 
During this same era, deposit levels at the Wisselbank stopped growing. Figure 15 
plots annual deposit levels, and, despite one-year peaks in 1645 and 1650, a slow-
ing of the Wisselbank’s growth is evident. Instead of viewing this as a sign of the 
Wisselbank failing, however, we view this as a sign that the campaign against de-
basement was succeeding, for less debasement reduced demand for Wisselbank 
balances. While we have no measure for the amount of debasement occurring 
over all the relevant mints, Figure 7, above, does show a decline in the debase-
ment of lioncrown coins by the provincial mints in this era. Moreover, the surge 
in rixdollar production around 1650 was apparently accompanied by little de-
basement (Polak 1998b, 103-49).   38




















































































Source: van Dillen 1934, 117-9. 
A number of factors were coming together to discourage Dutch debasement at 
mid-century. The development of the agio meant the successful protection of 
creditors and reduced incentives to debase. The 1645 mint ordinance reduced the 
number of coins holding official valuations, so fewer types of coins could be used 
to short-change creditors. The end of the Eighty Years’ War in 1648 reduced gov-
ernment demand for seigniorage. Finally, rixdollars were now viewed as an ex-
port coin, so the surge in production suggests a recovery in international trade.
43 
Authorities eventually responded to this situation by adjusting their lawful price 
in 1652 and 1653 (van Dillen 1964a, 364). The adjustments, called tolerations, did 
                                                 
43 Here we would be remiss not to mention the role of the “financial revolution” in the Dutch Re-
public. Effectively, this meant that war expenditures were financed through funded, long-term 
debt that bore relatively low interest rates (see ‘t Hart 1997). Debt levels (temporarily) stabilized 
following the cessation of hostilities in 1648. The Wisselbank was not directly impacted by these 
developments, since it was not concerned with the management of public debt, but it did ulti-
mately benefit through the lessening of the provinces’ incentives to debase.   39
not apply to the Wisselbank, so the same coin, the patagon, was lawfully valued at 
2.4 florin at the exchange bank but at a higher price in circulation. 
Still, government authorities were not happy with the patagons and the agio, and 
van Dillen suggests that a spurt of ordinance tinkering occurred in the 1650s. The 
1645 mint ordinance was renewed in 1652 and 1653, but tolerances for circulation 
coins were added. A mint ordinance of 1654 complains that the agio was high and 
uncertain. It was high because, as a moneychanger, the Wisselbank was only to 
charge a modest withdrawal fee, typically less than 0.5 percent. After 1645, the 
agio was greater than this, and it increased from 1646 to 1652. The agio was un-
certain because it was a market price. In response, the Mint Ordinance of Novem-
ber 1654 increased the Wisselbank price of a patagon to 2.45 florin while the law-
ful circulating price was 2.5 (van Dillen 1964a, 364). This created another “hair-
cut” for depositors, for there is no mention of a special withdrawal agio to com-
pensate depositors. Less than two years later, the 1654 ordinance was revoked.  
The Amsterdam city council felt that the coins of the Wisselbank had fallen into 
“decadence.” To improve the situation, the value of patagons was reduced back to 
2.4 florin and the withdrawal fee was set at 1/8 percent. All this is based on ob-
scure references found by van Dillen, but the overall picture suggests that authori-
ties just did not know what to do with the agio. 
F. The Mint Ordinance of 1659. 
The strangeness of the Dutch monetary situation derived from a monetary base 
built on foreign coin. The Republic was not receiving seigniorage from these 
coins, nor was it in control of their quality. Similarly, the Wisselbank was ex-
pected to defend the quality of coins available to depositors, but it could not mint 
high-quality versions of the coins used for withdrawal. To undo the situation, the 
Republic introduced new coins in 1659 that mimicked the coins from the southern 
Netherlands. The silver dukaat and the silver rijder were made slightly lighter 
than their respective southern substitutes, the patagon and the dukaton. The new   40
coins quickly replaced the old coins, and the change ushered in an era of stable 
coinage.
44 
To facilitate acceptance of the new coins, the existing pricing system was main-
tained, so a silver dukaat was officially made worth 2.4 florin at the Wisselbank 
and 2.5 florin as current money outside of the exchange bank. The distinction be-
tween the banco unit of account and current unit of account was codified at the 
national level, to the double pricing that had begun 15 years earlier was recog-
nized and made a permanent part of the system. Another aspect of how the 1659 
ordinance minimized disruption of the monetary system was that the new silver 
dukaat came to be called the rixdollar in everyday use.  The old rixdollar came to 
be called the bank rixdollar. Similarly, the new rijder was called the ducaton in 
usage. 
G. Summary. 
To summarize this long section, from the 1610’s to the 1650’s, the Amsterdam 
Wisselbank was buffeted by a series of mint ordinances, for the exchange bank 
was caught in offsetting policy goals. Policy makers desired to stabilize both coin 
content and coin values. Unfortunately, each new fixed-price regime created un-
stable dynamics, and some directly undermined the Wisselbank’s ability to pro-
tect creditors. 
Ironically, the road to stability was to embrace flexible coin prices. This was 
managed by allowing a floating exchange rate, called the agio, to exist between 
deposits at the Wisselbank and money circulating outside the exchange bank. Of-
ficial recognition of the agio, however, occurred only at the end of a bewildering 
chain of regulatory missteps. By 1659, just getting the Dutch Republic to again 
use its own coins was a greater concern than the cognitive dissonance of a coin 
                                                 
44Complete victory remained elusive. A rise in the price of silver during the second Anglo-Dutch 
war (1665-1667) and during subsequent hostilities severely cut into the business of the mints. This 
resulted in a wave of marginal debasement by mints outside of Holland and a slight depreciation 
in the value of current money (Korthals Altes 2001, 54-59). The value of Wisselbank money was 
unaffected, however. A fully stable national coinage was finally achieved after passage of the mint 
ordinances of 1691 and 1694 (de Vries and van der Woude 1997, 83).   41
having two prices. Once the new set of Dutch coins was well established, the dual 
pricing structure of the agio was an accepted and, we assert, a beneficial part of 
the monetary system. Superficially the agio on bank money resembled the histori-
cally common “overvaluation” (stygeringhe) of heavy coin. But the key differ-
ence was that the unit of account for commercial transactions was unambiguously 
tied to the essentially non-circulating heavy coin in the vault of the Wisselbank. 
 
VII. Genesis of a Central Bank. 
From its inception the Wisselbank carried out one of the key functions of modern 
central banks, the operation of a “real-time gross settlement system,” i.e., a giro or 
book-entry payment system that allowed for efficient settlement of the high vol-
ume of commercial transactions flowing through Amsterdam (Neal 2000, 121-2). 
Total balances at the Wisselbank were relatively modest, always less than 20 mil-
lion florin in the late seventeenth century, and less than 30 million in the eight-
eenth (van Dillen 1934, 117-123). By way of comparison, de Vries and van der 
Woude (1997, 90) estimate the total money (coin) stock of the Republic at 120 
million florin in 1690 and 200 million a century later. 
The low levels of Wisselbank deposits no doubt understate their importance to the 
Dutch economy, however, as the velocity of transactions in Wisselbank balances 
was probably quite high. Writing in 1766, Jacques Accarias de Sérionne (cited in 
Braudel 1984, 240) put the daily value of Wisselbank transactions at ten to twelve 
million florins per day. Given a mid-eighteenth century national income of around 
250 million florin (de Vries and van der Woude 1997, 702), this would in turn 
imply that the Wisselbank “turned over” transactions equal to the annual value of 
the Republic’s GDP within a space of less than six weeks. This pace is not quite 
as frenetic as that of modern large-value payment systems, which routinely turn 
over their host countries’ annual GDP within a week or less (Committee on Pay-
ment and Settlement Systems 2006). It is nonetheless an astonishingly high figure 
for an economy that has often been described as “pre-industrial.”   42
The mint ordinance of 1659 set the stage for the Wisselbank to assume additional 
central-bank-like responsibilities. As guardian of a separate, privileged medium of 
exchange with its own unit of account, the Wisselbank was implicitly entrusted 
with a mission of maintaining price stability. This mission proved problematic as 
long as the value of Wisselbank deposits was rigidly bound to the value of the 
coins within its vault. The agio could and did fluctuate erratically with market 
conditions, and a sufficient drop in the agio could cause account holders to with-
draw coin from the bank. The French invasion of 1672 saw an apparent negative 
agio (no precise figures are available) and a run on the Wisselbank ensued (van 
Dillen 1964a, 369-371; Korthals Altes 2001, 55). While the bank was able to 
withstand the run, ongoing fluctuations in the agio no doubt contributed to an ap-
petite for institutional reform. 
In 1683 a facility was created whereby Wisselbank account holders could “park” 
gold and heavy silver coins at the bank for a period of six months.
45 Anyone mak-
ing use of this facility received a credit on the books of the bank as well as a re-
ceipt. When the six-month-period expired, the receipt holder could, in return for 
payment of a minuscule amount of interest, either renew the agreement or repur-
chase his coins. Coins not so reclaimed then fell to the bank (van Dillen 1964b, 
394-395).
46 
The introduction of the “receipt” system transformed both Amsterdam financial 
markets and the Wisselbank itself. The receipts are recognizable to modern eyes 
as European call options on the deposited coin, or equivalently, put options on 
Wisselbank funds. The availability of these options, which were freely assignable, 
greatly improved the liquidity of the Amsterdam market in precious metals (van 
                                                 
45 Later on receipts were issued against uncoined precious metal and even current money (with a 
“haircut” reflecting the prevalent agio). Vault inventories reported in van Dillen (1925) suggest 
that the presence of this haircut discouraged the deposit of current money. 
46 Van Dillen (1964b, 395) suggests that these transactions were not in fact loans but repurchase 
agreements.   43
Dillen 1964b, 395).
47 Receipts were readily traded against Wisselbank funds, as 
described by Adam Smith: 
The person who has a receipt … finds always plenty of bank cred-
its, or bank money to buy at the ordinary price; and the person who 
has bank money … finds receipts always in equal abundance 
(Wealth of Nations IV.3.20). 
Since it was generally cheaper to purchase an option than to withdraw funds (and 
so incur withdrawal fees), redemptions became uncommon. At some point, 
probably in the late seventeenth century, the Wisselbank quit redeeming deposits. 
Wisselbank money had become a “virtual currency.” Unfortunately for this 
change in policy, surely one of the most momentous in economic history, “no or-
dinance nor any precise date can be assigned (van Dillen 1934, 101).” 
To us, such a story requires a remarkable indifference to the right of withdrawal. 
The end of withdrawal was, practically speaking, a termination of debt that af-
fected thousands of wealthy people. Any collective or noisome response would 
have had a very strong position, so the threshold of perceived harm needed to 
trigger a response was likely low. The lack of a discernable response suggests that 
withdrawals were rare and that the expectation of ever wanting to make a with-
drawal was rare. Such low expectations of withdrawal mean that developments in 
and out of the Wisselbank combined in a powerful way.
48 
Absent withdrawal, a way had to found to maintain the value of Wisselbank bal-
ances. The hit-upon method, which would again seem quite natural to modern ob-
servers, was open market operations, meaning the sale and purchase of receipts 
against bank funds. By this means, the Wisselbank was able to keep the agio on 
bank money over current money in a very narrow range over most of the eight-
eenth century, between 4 1/4 and 4 7/8 percent (van Dillen 1964b, 404). More-
over, the Wisselbank could use the agio as a “sluice gate” to manage specie flows 
(Neal 2000, 122). Again this does not quite correspond to our modern day notion 
                                                 
47 Receipts against deposits were already required in 1654, suggesting some earlier experimenta-
tion with the post-1683 system. 
48 Gillard (2004) stresses the role of cashiers.   44
of “open market operations” as the sale and purchase of government securities, 
but is obviously quite close to modern practice, common in many countries, of 
pegging the value of a currency through intervention in markets for foreign ex-
change. 
The Wisselbank’s use of open market operations marked a significant develop-
ment in the evolution of central banks (Gillard 2004). Earlier public banks (in 
Barcelona, Genoa, and Venice) had operated giro payment systems. Separate, 
commercial units of account had existed both in cities with a public bank (e.g., 
Genoa; see Fratianni and Spinelli 2005) and in cities without (e.g., Florence; see 
Sargent and Velde 2003). Through its open market operations, the Wisselbank put 
the pieces together in a new way: by trading receipts, it could shore up the mar-
ket’s confidence in its inconvertible money as settlement medium, while simulta-
neously enhancing the liquidity of the precious metal whose value underpinned 
the Republic’s monetary system. 
In summary, by the end of the seventeenth century, the Bank of Amsterdam was 
performing three functions that are routinely carried out by central banks today: 
operating a large-value payment system, creating a form of money not directly 
redeemable for coin, and managing the value of this money through open market 
operations. Ironically, the Bank of Amsterdam may be best remembered for what 
it did not do, i.e., take on what are now viewed as the definitive central-bank 
functions of circulating note issue, operation of a discount window, and the pur-
chase of government securities.
49 Even so, the activities of the Wisselbank set a 
strong precedent. As the seventeenth century came to a close, the idea of a central 
bank was a proven concept, and ready for its now-famous voyage across the 
North Sea. 
                                                 
49 We are abstracting from the relative minor amounts lent on occasion to the Amsterdam city 
treasury and the Municipal Loan Chamber. Also, the receipts were arguably banknote-like in some 
respects, as they circulated freely and had value in exchange.   45
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